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COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

UNSEX CEDAW? NO! SUPER-SEX
IT!
BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL*
Injustice and discrimination against women persists
everywhere.'
In no2 socicty do women enjoy the same opportunities as
men.
Unemployment hits poor families hard, regardless of
whether it is a man or a woman who is laid off.... [But]
women's lower employment rates, weaker control over
property and resources, concentration in informal and
vulnerable forms of employment with lower earnings, and
less social protection, all place 3women in a weaker
position than men to weather crises.
Recalling that discrimination against women violates the
principles of equality of rights and respect for human
dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on
equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic
and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of
the prosperity of society and the family and makes more
difficult the full development of the potentialities of

Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin
College of Law.
Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to Commission on the
Status of Women, Equal Rights, Equal Opportunities and Progress for All
(March 3, 2010) [hereinafter Ban Ki=moon Address] (transcript available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statmentsfull.asp?
statID= 736).
2

U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2 (1995).

3 Richard Kind & Caroline Sweetman, Gender Perspectiveson the Global
Economic Crisis 2 (Oxfam Int'l Discussion Paper, 2010), available at http://
w w w. peace women. org/assets / file / Resources/N GO /
ERCGendcrPerspectivesGlobalCrisis Oxfam_201 O.pdf (quotations omitted).
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women in the service of their countries and of humanity.

4

INTRODUCTION
This Article reflects upon Darren Rosenblum's provocative
piece Unsex CEDA W or What s Wrong with Women ' Rights. At
the outset I should note that this critical analysis should not be
misinterpreted. I do not quarrel with Professor Rosenblum's
observations that inequality in law and life is much broader than
sex inequalities. To the contrary, I am in full accord with him
that discrimination along other categorical axes is also
undesirable and sometimes as prevalent as sex inequality.
Indeed, oftentimes such other discriminatory tendencies dovetail
with those rooted in sex discrimination. 5
Where we diverge, however, is in his proposal that the
category woman, and the pursuit of equality rights utilizing a
focus on sex, be eliminated altogether. He claims it is wrong to
focus on women's rights. Yet even in that regard I think our
differences could be framed as methodological rather than
substantive. Professor Rosenblum suggests that we unsex
CEDAW and that the convention focus on gender in lieu of sex.
Moreover, he posits that any consideration of discrimination on
the basis of sex include men as well as women. I agree that the
convention ought to protect against discrimination on the basis
4 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Mar. I, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/180,
at pmbl. [hereinafter CEDAW].

5 See e.g., Berta E. Hemndez-Truyol, The Gender Bend: Culture, Sex,
and Sexuality-A LatCritical Human Rights Map of Latina/o Border Crossings,
83 IND. L.J. 1283 (2008) (exploxing the intersections of culture, sex, and
sexuality); Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, The Latindia and Mestizajes
(Trasculturation): Of Cultures, Conquests, and LatCritical Feminism, 3 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 63 (1999) (interrogating the Latina identity); Berta E.
Hemndez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas (The Forgotten Ones): Gendered in Justice!
Gendered Injustice-Latinas,Fronteras,and the Law, I J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
353 (1998) (noting impact of gender and ethnicity of matters of justice); Berta E.
Hemdndez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered-Normativities,Latinas, and a LatCrit
Paradigm,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882 (1997) (reviewing the multidimensionality of
Latinas); Berta E. Hemindez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at
the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 369 (1994) (noting multidimensionality of Latinas/os).
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of gender as well as sex. Moreover, there is no question that the
category sex includes men as well as women, although it is
incontrovertible that the aim of CEDAW was to protect women
because of the privations women experience in their lives-a
reality around the world, north and south, east and west alike.
Thus, our disagreement is narrow and centers on the ongoing
relevance and significance- indeed, necessity-of the category
woman.
In this response I grapple with this narrow point: it is not
only relevant but necessary to continue to have women, qua
women, be an organizing category. To be sure, "woman" is not a
singular, essential category. 6 I have already suggested that
"woman" should not be the sole category for analysis. Moreover,
while I contend that the category "woman" should not beindeed cannot be-monolithic, I urge that such a category
should remain among the myriad classifications relevant to
rights discourse; to conversations about marginalized,
subordinated, or peripheral actors in the local as well as the
world stage.
This position does not equate to a blind concession that
CEDAW is perfect; it is patent that it is incomplete. However,
one should not fall into the trap of (forgive the cliche) throwing
the baby out with the bathwater. There are ways to achieve
Professor Rosenblum's goals while still recognizing the realities
of women's lives.
I.

FLASHBACKS
A.

Senior year in high school, college application
season:

I was born in Cuba and raised in Puerto Rico, where I
attended high school. My parents were educated at the
University of Havana. So when it was time to fill out college
applications, Mr. Wedge-Ernest Wedge, the headmaster at my
school-was the only one who could provide any guidance and
advice with respect to attending college in the U.S.

6 See id.
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When I met with Mr. Wedge to discuss college choices, he
suggested that I apply to Cornell through its early admissions
program. He wanted me to go to an Ivy League school-not that
anyone in my family had a clue what that meant. But, as he was
the expert, his desires werefaits accomplis.
Notwithstanding my healthy, youthful skepticism, once he
explained what early admissions meant, I really thought he was
up to something good. Any sixteen-year-old would prefer to fill
out one application instead of a bunch of them-especially when
her then-boyfriend was coming home for the weekend from
MIT and the plan was to go sailing. What sixteen-year-old
wouldn't choose sailing if there was an option? So I happily
went home thinking that it would be one form, not six, that I had
to complete. But then I read the directions in the Cornell forms,
which clearly stated that early admission was only for boys.
Deflated and resigned, I would not get to play much that
weekend, I proceeded to fill out six forms..
On Monday I went to report my discovery to Mr. Wedge.
Mind you, I was not shocked by the exclusion; I took it as a fact
of life. Mr. Wedge, however, did not believe me. He called the
admissions office at Cornell to inform it that I had made a
mistake in my application-that it should have been for early
admissions. He was quickly told that it could not be done; early
admissions was only for boys.
B. As a lawyer in Washington working for the Federal
Government:
A friend working at a firm called me to let me know there
was an opening for which she thought I would be a perfect
candidate. Not one to close doors, I went to an initial screening
interview, then to a full day interview, and finally on the callback to meet the "big partner" with whom I'd be working most
closely. In the course of the "big partner" chat he said, and I am
paraphrasing as closely as I can recall, "so I am not sure that it is
the proper place for a girl to work with labor leaders who smoke
cigars and use foul language." Unlike my reaction in high
school, this time I was upset. At that point I knew I was not
going to get the job; I did not care because at that point, I did not
want it. However, the kicker came when I told my mom (who is
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a lawyer and diplomat by training) and dad the story. My dad
quickly said, "Didn't you tell him you are not a woman, that you
are a lawyer?" This from the same man who just a few weeks
earlier had been considering whether he could make an offer to
the best candidate he interviewed for a job because she was a
woman. The catch there was that he was concerned whether the
clients (read: men) in Latin America would accept dealing with
her because she was a woman.
And although that was some time ago, and I doubt many
legal employers would be so vocal about a similar situation
today even if they still felt the same way, the landscape has not
changed. I still regularly get stunned female students coming
into my office, aghast that during their interviews, they were
asked about plans to get married or to have children. Many of
these women report that their male friends do not experience the
same inquiries. Sexism persists, particularly sexism against
women.
C. While interviewing for law teaching positions:
I was in a major city at an on-campus interview when, after
an apparently successful visit, my host, a lovely gentleman, led
me to his office and offered me a cup of coffee to wind down a
"terrific day." I accepted, requesting decaf. He went to get the
coffee. While he was out, another member of the appointments
committee came in to his office and said "I hope Joe doesn't
mind that we voted without him but we'd like to make you an
offer so let me take you to the Dean." In the meantime, my host
entered his office and was told about the vote. He said, "Terrific
day indeed." As he handed me my cup he said "you know, I
don't think of you as a minority." Woman is not a monolithic
category. 7

This Article first addresses the ongoing relevance of the
category "woman." To support that stance, in Part II the piece
presents data on women's status today; it shows how women
currently remain in precarious positions around the world simply
7 See id.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

because they are women. Next, there is no doubt that
discrimination's reach is greater than just women-there are also
the categories of race, class, sexuality, and gender to name a few
of the axes along which there is rampant disparity in status,
dignity, and respect. Thus, Part III suggests certain interpretive
tools that can result in a broader deployment of CEDAW's
protections which, in turn, could expand the reach and utility of
CEDAW. Such a move would provide some, although not all, of
the relief that Professor Rosenblum desires.
Finally, in Part IV, I acknowledge that, notwithstanding the
suggested interpretive tools, the Convention would better serve
humankind if its provisions were more far-reaching.
Consequently, this work proposes that rather than giving up on
CEDAW, it should be amended by protocol to expand its reach.
The proposal encourages an incorporation of principles, much
like the Yogyakarta Principles ("Principles"), as a second
optional protocol to CEDAW.
The work concludes that the inquiry into whether the
category woman is one that should be valid in an ideal world is
not ripe in today's world. People who are perceived to comprise
the category "woman" are less likely to enjoy the trappings of
full personhood. Thus at present, the reality about the condition
of women around the globe translates to it being a necessary
category, albeit a non-monolithic, non-essentialized one.
II.

The Ongoing Relevance of "Woman"

This Part's goal is to show, in light of facts about the
condition of women around the world, that the category
"woman" remains essential. This portion of the Article utilizes
two general sources: one, a rich complex of information
presented by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the
occasion of the celebration of International Women's Day; two,
facts and figures culled from a number of recent reports on the
condition of women around the world.
A. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's International
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Women's Day Address 8
When on March 3, 2010, United Nations Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon addressed the Commission on the Status of
Women in order to mark International Women's Day, he called
attention to the UN's unwavering commitment to women's

8 See Ban Ki-moon Address, supra note I. The irony does not escape me
that I am using an address delivered on International Women's Day to establish
the relevance of the category. I can almost hear Darrcn saying: "Why
International Women s Day? There is no International Men's Day?" But here I
need to reiterate that I am not advocating for the exclusion of any category, just
for the continued inclusion of "woman," because work in regard to women's
equality is far from done.
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equality, 9 noting the organization's support for "equal rights,
equal opportunities and progress for all."' 10 He also claimed that
"gender equality and women's empowerment are fundamental to
the very identity of the United Nations," rights that he labeled

9 Id. This claim in the speech is, of course, a reflection of the existing
international law. CEDAW providcs that:
[T]he Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the
principle of the inadmissibility of discrimination and
proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction
of any kind, including distinction based on sex."
CEDAW, supra note 4, at pmbl. CEDAW also has a general provision
prohibiting discrimination:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term
'discrimination against women' shall mean any
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.
Id. at art. 1. Other Human Rights documents also include such a
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. See, e.g. International
Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 22-May 13, 1968, Declaration of Tehran, P
2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/31 art. 2 (May 13, 1968), reprinted in United Nations,
Human Rights, A Compilation of International Instruments 43-44 (1988)
[hereinafter UNHDR] ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status."); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, 16 Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICESCR];
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673; Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, opened for signatureNov. 17, 1988, 9 I.L.M: 673 [hereinafter Protocol of
San Salvador].
10

See Ban Ki-moon Address, supra note 1.
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"inalienable."' I
During the address, the Secretary-General delivered both
the good and the disheartening news. He provided examples of
women's advances since the 1995 Beijing Declaration and
Programme of Action-the documents that were the product of
the Fourth World Conference on Women. One area of progress
he noted was the proliferation of local policies and laws that
protect and promote equality as well as reproductive rights and
health. 12 He also observed that around the world a growing
numbers of girls are receiving a primary education, an increasing
number of women are business owners and loan recipients, and
more women are participating in government both by enjoying
the franchise and by being elected as representatives to local and
international positions. 13
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon praised the women's
movement of today as a global movement. He recognized that
"[w]omen everywhere are mobilizing
for equality and
14
empowerment - and succeeding.'
But the Secretary-General's comments also addressed less
pleasant realities. He conceded that the work of attaining
equality for women was far from completed; a substantial
struggle lies ahead because "injustice and discrimination against
women persists everywhere."' 15
For example, he recognized the sad reality that seventy
percent of women experience violence in their life, often
justified as cultural tropes or acceptable traditions that are
untouchable. 16 In a move that could not have been popular
among relativists, the Secretary-General rejected the cultural
I Id.
2 Id.
3

1 1d.
14Id.
5

1 1d.
16See Ban Ki-moon Address, supra notc I
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pretexts for violence 7 and specifically condemned numerous
practices that some claim as untouchably cultural, such as early
and forced marriages, honor killings, sexual abuses, and
trafficking. Instead of accepting these acts as culturally
contingent, he called them out as abuse and even as criminal
conduct. 18
Beyond violent acts, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also
took note of some other areas in which women still find progress
lacking. Noteworthy among these are concerns of health, social
inequalities, and economic privation. With respect to health
concerns, high maternal and infant mortality rates still plague
many locations around the world, and many women lack access
to family planning. 19
Beyond health, social factors such as gender stereotyping
and discrimination are still global realities that impede women's
progress. Women's political representation has been abysmal, a
fact Professor Rosenblum's own work confirms. 20
Finally,
economic realities still get in the way of women's thrivingwoman are disproportionately poor, and suffer other economic
privations such as low wages, unstable informal employment,
and unsafe conditions of employment. 21
These preliminary observations, and others that will follow,
serve to establish that we are not in a legal, social, cultural or
economic space in which we can even contemplate rendering
redundant the category "woman." Before presenting more data,
however, it is appropriate to make some observations regarding
7

1 1d.
18

Id.

9

' 1d.
20

Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on

the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.REv. 1119

(2006) (arguing in favor of quotas for women's political representation);
Darren Rosenblum, hiternalizing Gender: Why lnternational Law Theory
Should Adopt Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 759

(2007).
21See Ban Ki-moon Address, supra note I.
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the Secretary-General's address. Twice in the comments the
Secretary-General used the concept of gender separate and apart
from the concept of woman. The first time was when he talked
about "gender empowerment and women's equality"; the second
was when he talked about gender stereotyping. While these
moves are significant, they presented him with a missed
opportunity. The observations plainly recognize two interrelated
yet distinct categories: gender and sex (although the latter was
raised as "woman"). By collapsing the categories rather than
problematizing or critically analyzing them vis A vis the
principle of equality, 22 the Secretary-General gave credence to
the critique that the UN only utilizes "gender" as a synonym for
woman. This move is soundly and effectively challenged in
Professor Rosenblum's paper, a criticism with which I fully
agree. Yet, that does not mean that the category "woman" is
irrelevant or superfluous. As the reports discussed below show, it
is still a necessary category.
B. Recent Reports
Five recent reports reveal the ongoing significance and
importance to the goal of equality of retaining the category
woman. 23 The research in these works focuses on different
populations, varied issues, and utilizes different methodologies.
Given these differences, their uniform findings are striking:
women's inequality is ubiquitous-across continents, cultures,

22 For some literature that underscores the gender/sex dif/erences see K.
DAVIS, M. EVANS AND J. LORBER, NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD. ASSOC., HANDBOOK
OF GENDER AND WOMEN'S STUDIES (2006), available at http://www.nwsa.org/

rescarch/genderstudies.php.
23

INT'L LABOUR ORG.,

WOMEN IN LABOUR MARKETS:

MEASURING

(2010), available at http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---edcmp/---cmp clm/---trends/documcnts/
PROGRESS AND IDENTIFYING

CHALLENGES

publication/wcms 123835.pdf [hereinafter

WOMEN INLABOUR MARKETS];

U.N.

NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, POWER VOICE AND RIGHTS: A TURNING POINT FOR

GENDER EQUALITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (2010), available at htp://

www2.undprcc.lk/cxt/pvr/?q=nodc/3 [hereinafter

POWER VOICE AND RIGHTS];
PLAN INT'L, BECAUSE I AM A GIRL: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S GIRLS (2007)

[hercinafter BECAUSE I AM A GIRL]; UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
CHILDREN 2007: WOMEN AND CHILDREN-THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND OF GENDER
EQUALITY (2006) [hereinafter DOUBLE DIVIDEND]; RICARDO HAUSMAN, LAURA
D. TYSON & SAADIA ZAHIDI, THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP: REPORT 2007 (2007).
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religions, social classes, and nations. 24 The materials and the
conclusions are significant for legal analysis as they establish
that culture, society, politics, and economics all play a role in the
reality of human lives-women's lives-and the quest for
equality.
The International Labor Organization's March 2010 report,
titled Women in labour markets,25 provides data on women and
work. This study unequivocally reports that women in the labor
force are experiencing "continuing gender disparity ... in terms
26
of both opportunities and quality of employment.
Approximately one quarter of the women who work fall into the
classification of "unpaid contributing family workers" which
essentially means that they do not get paid for their work. 27
Even when women do get paid for their work, they
experience disparities in the labor they perform and the pay they
receive. Work segregation-the so called pink collar
phenomenon-is a reality: working women are concentrated in
"low pay, long hours . . . and informal" jobs. 28 Significantly,
because of the nature of women's employment, and because of a
"male breadwinner bias" favoring men for employment, it is not
surprising that women's jobs have been disproportionately

24 Although some of the reports use the term woman and some use the
term gender, they really are focusing on women, not gender or gender identity.
Significantly, the discussion on gender is salient because of its absence.
25 WOMEN IN LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 23. Although this and the
following reports are on Asia, it should not be translated into a unique
geographic phenomenon. Women around the world face the same conditions and
obsticales. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. See also BERTA E.

HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEVE POWELL, JUST TRADE 192-205 (2009) (focusing

on gender issues in work in the Americas).
26Id. at x.
27Id.
28 Id., see generally Berta E. Hemndez-Truyol, Law Is Not Enough, 37
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1031 (2005). (reviewing ANNE-MARIE MOONEY
COT7ER, GENDER INJUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF

EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT (2004)) (discussing women's subordinate status in
the workplace and work segregation).
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negatively affected by the economic crigis.29
The report recognizes that as long as gender stereotypes
exist they will influence the workforce and "gender justice" will
remain an elusive aspiration. Stereotypes (proscribed by
CEDAW) embed bias in "economic and social institutions and
development processes."
The suggested solution is a "new
'gender approach." ' 0 This ILO report thus grapples with the
related issues of gender roles and sex discrimination, making
clear the relevance of both categories in attaining equality.
The other 2010 report, Power Voice and Rights: A Turning
Point for Gender Equality in Asia and the Pacific, confirms
these concepts. In addition, it lists the problems that flow from
prevalent and systemic sex/gender inequalities.
In every country across Asia and the Pacific,
pervasive gender inequality remains a barrier
to progress, justice and social stability, and
deprives the region of a significant source of
human potential. Inequality persists despite
robust growth and progress, and cuts even
29 WOMEN IN LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 23, at 45. The study in Asia

provides as follows: "In terms of identifying why the crisis will impact, men and
women differently, the report points to gender-based job segregation (see the
discussion in box 7), the fact that women make up a greater share than men of
the "buffer workforce" listed above, a stronger tendency for women than men to
fall outside of the labour force rather than continue with the job search (the socalled "male breadwinner bias"), the shift to informal employment for both sexes
but probably more so for women than men, and an "added worker" effect if
women take up work to help the family to withstand the crisis and the possible
negative consequences when it comes to children's welfare."
30 WOMEN IN LABOR MARKETS, supra note 23, at xi, xii. The "new"

gender approach would "(1) encourage men to share family responsibilities
through behaviour-changing measures (such as paternity leave); (2) quantify the
value of unpaid care work; (3) develop educational systems that challenge
stereotypical gender roles [reference omitted]; (4) challenge tendencies toward a
discrimination- or exploitation-based definition of "women's work" (for
example, by broadening access for women to employment in an enlarged scope
of industries and occupations while also encouraging male employment in
sectors traditionally defined as "female" as a means of raising both the average
pay and status of the occupation); and finally, (5) focus on raising the quality of
work in all sectors, extending social protection, benefits and security to those in
non-standard forms of work." Id. at xii.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

deeper for poorer or otherwise excluded
groups. It is time to catalyze change by
focusing on institutions in three arenaseconomics, politics and the law. Deliberate
public policy choices, combined with attitudes
and assessments that favour social justice can
foster progress towards gender equality. 31
Two 2007 reports reinforce the 2010 reports and provide some
disturbing details about girls' and women's lives. The first
report, Because I am a Girl: The State of the World's Girls
2007,32 delivers bleak factual realities on a number of important
markers. I t establishes that 100 million girls are missing. 33 On
family life, it reveals that girls spend more time on noneconomic work than boys, 34 resulting in girls having less time
for school and play. 35 When it comes to education, the report
provides the now familiar but still depressing data that, of the
estimated 115 million children of age who did not attend school
in 2001, 62 million were girls. 36 This translates to the reality that
a disproportionate number of girls are not receiving an education
simply because they are girls. 37 With respect to health, the data
is grim. For instance, 66 percent of the children between fifteen
and nineteen years old who are newly infected with HIV in subSaharan Africa are girls. 38 The figures on economics and
violence support the dismal data that the Secretary-General
emphasized in his previously discussed address. With respect to
31POWER, VOICE AND RIGHTS, supra note 23.
32BECAUSE I AM A GIRL, supra note 23.
33
34

ld. at 23.
ld. at 33.

35Id.
36Id. at 51
37BECAUSE I AM A GIRL, supra note 23, at 51, 55.
38Id. at 67. Othcr health issues for girls include nutrition (in some cultures
men and boys eat first and there often is not enough left), reproductive health,
mental health, and STDs. Id. at 67-83.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

the economic privation women experience, it is shocking that 70
percent of the 1.5 billion persons living on $1 per day or less are
female. 3 9 Similarly disturbing is the date on violence:
approximately half of the sexual assaults worldwide are on girls
fifteen or younger. 40
These dire realities are confirmed in The State of the
Worlds Children 2007: Women and Children: Double Dividend
of Gender Equality.41 This report bluntly notes:
Gender discrimination is pervasive. While the
degrees and forms of inequality may vary,
women and girls are deprived of equal access
to resources, opportunities and political power
in every region of the world. The oppression
of girls and women can include the preference
for sons over daughters, limited personal and
professional choices for girls and women, the
denial of basic human2 rights and outright
4
gender-based violence.
A World Health Organization study cited in DOUBLE DIVIDEND

revealed that up to 70 percent of women experience physical or
sexual assault from an intimate partner, making domestic
43
violence the most common form of violence against women.
Beyond the realities of women's lives already discussedthe violence; the health and education deficits; the
disproportionate poverty; the home life in which they have
responsibility for the family but are often not the decision
11Id. at 85. For the issues of job segregation, uncmployment, child labor,
concentration in the informal economy, and domestic work. Id. at 85-101.
40 Id. at 103. Girls from minority and indigenous groups, girls with
disabilities, girls in conflict, refugees, homeless girls face particularly precarious
lives. Id. at 103-115.
41 DOUBLE DIVIDEND, supra note 23.

42/d. at 6 (citations omitted). Although this report uses the term "gender"
it addresses women's and girls' disadvantages because of their sex.
43 Id.

at 7.
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makers; and the work where they toil longer hours for less paywomen also experience two other "gaps." One is an "asset gap":
in comparison with men, women own only a fraction of
available land. 44 And, notwithstanding a modicum of progress
noted by Secretary-General Ban, women also experience a gap
in political representation. 45 This is significant in women's
progress because studies show that women in politics make46 a
difference with respect to issues that are important to women.
While economists utilized a different methodological
approach in their 2007 Global Gender Gap Index study,47 their
conclusion was consonant with the other studies discussed:
ongoing gender disparities persist. Indeed, the opening lines of
the report not only echo the discussions above, they establish the
ubiquity of women's unequal position around the world:
"Gender based inequality is a phenomenon that affects the
majority of the world's cultures, religions, nations and income
48
groups."
This study, rather than measure absolutes, measures gender
gaps. These gaps in turn are measured in opportunities rather
than available resources. Similarly, the study measures outcomes
in order to show where men and women are located with respect
to the measured variables; it does not measure starting points.
Finally, it ranks countries vis Avis gender equality as opposed to
empowerment. 49 It measured these gaps in four "pillars"categories the analysts deems fundamental: economic
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, political

44Id.at 41.
45 See Ban Ki-moon Address, supra note 1.But see Rosenblum, supra
note 20.

46DOUBLE DIVIDEND, supra note 23, at 51.
47 RICARDO HAUSMAN, LAURA D. TYSON & SAADIA ZAHIDI, WORLD
ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP: REPORT 2007 (2007).

48Id. at3.
49Id. at

3-4.
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empowerment, and health and survival. 50
The conclusions gleaned from data gathered from 128
countries are telling:
[T]he 128 countries covered, representing over
90% of the world's population, are close to
eliminating the gap between women and men's
health and education outcomes: almost 92% of
the educational outcomes gap and 96% of the
health outcomes gap has been closed.
However, the gap between women and men on
economic participation and political
empowerment remains wide: only 58% of the
economic outcomes gap and only 14%51of the
political outcomes gap has been closed.
Here it is relevant to consider this study's approach. With respect
to the health and education outcomes, for example, the fact that
the gap has been closed to a large degree does not signify that
everyone is educated and healthy. To the contrary, it just means
that where everyone is educated, women and men are close in
education-women lag only a little behind. However, it also
means that when the population as a whole is lacking in literacy
-women and men are equally lacking in education-women are
nevertheless a little behind. The same is true for health. And, of
course, the gaps in political empowerment and economic
participation, even with this methodology, show that conditions
of life are hugely disparate for men and women, with women
lagging behind men simply because of their sex.
In sum, no matter who reports, or the methodology utilized,
50
Id. at 4. Fourteen different indicators wcrc utilized for the
measurements in the four categories. Id.

51 Id. at 13. Consistently, when the results were broken down by region,
the weakest performers overall, as well as in the specific pillars of economic
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, and health and survival
were Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa (not in the
same order). Interestingly, in the political empowerment pillar, the three weakest
regions were the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe, and North
America, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean,
Asia, and Oceania, with Western Europe being the strongest. Id. at 13-15.
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the world data shows that women do not fare as well as men in
any reporting category: health, education, welfare, economic
well-being, work and its conditions, or political participation. All
these realities are global and cut across religion, race, class, and
nation. They thus confirm that the non-essentialized, nonmonolithic category of woman is a relevant and important one.
Ill.

Interpreting CEDAW
A.

A Look at the Convention

The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention in
1979, and it entered into force in 1981,52 just one year before I

started teaching law school and almost twenty years after the
United States included sex in the list of prohibited bases of
discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.53
The Convention constituted an effort by the Commission
on the Status of Women (CSW) comprehensively to address the
locations of women's inequality. To be sure, myriad human
rights documents already proscribed discrimination against
women. 54 Moreover, the CSW had worked on numerous
conventions that protected particular rights of women. 55
However, the CSW recognized that such an approach was
fragmentary. It thus shifted its focus to CEDAW, which
represented a comprehensive effort to address the multiple
52

In 1963 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1921 requesting the

Economic and Social Council to ask the Commission on the Status of Women to
prepare a draft declaration on the elimination of discrimination against women.
Such a declaration was drafted and adopted by the General Assembly in 1967.
The idea of a binding treaty arose in 1972 and the text was drafted between 1976
and 1979. By resolution 34/180, the General Assembly adopted CEDAW in 1979
and commented that it would be desirable to have it come into force soon. The
Convention entered into force, as per its terms, 30 days after the ratification of
the twentieth state. See, e.g., http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
history.htm.
53 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. vii, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-2 et seq.
14 See

sources and accompanying text supra note 9.

55 See Short History of CEDAW Convention, DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC.
AFFS., U.N. DIVISION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, http://www.un.org/

womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm (last visited June 19, 2011 ).
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locations of women's inequality with the aim of ending all
discrimination against women. 56
Social realities also influenced the decision to concentrate
on an all-inclusive document. For example, during the 1960s
there was much growth in the understanding of the complex
nature of discrimination against women-of the subtle patterns
and the cultural veils that effected inequalities. 57 Similarly,
evidence emerged of the negative effect of development policies
on women. 58 In addition, it was becoming apparent that,
notwithstanding the inclusion of the prohibition against sex
discrimination in the general human rights documents, the
general human rights system was not being effective in the goal
to eradicate women's inequality.
The Convention, in an incontrovertibly male/female binary
framework, defines discrimination against women broadly; it
reaches social, political, economic, cultural, and civil realms. 59
As such, it recognizes that women's inequality is a reality and
unacceptable not only in the public but also in the private sector.
With such realities providing context, the Convention provides a
blueprint for nations to end such discrimination, including state

561d.

57 ij
581d.
59 CEDAW, supra note 4, at art. I (providing that '"discrimination against
women' shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis
of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.").
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60
undertakings to eliminate discrimination in both sectors.

The Convention is unique in recognizing that the myriad
locations of concern for women's equality include, among
others, the civil (e.g., political participation), economic (work),
social (maternity, child-care), cultural (roles), health
(reproductive in particular). It focuses specifically on matters of
human reproduction as well as the impact of culture and cultural
tropes on women's equality. The Convention also expressly
recognizes the indivisibility and interdependence of the different
categories of rights. For example, without social supports for
family life, including child-care, there is a diminished ability to
participate in public life, including work.
These observations are not to suggest that the Convention
is not flawed, or that in today's world it might not be drafted
utilizing different language. To be sure, some of its shortcomings
-beyond those engaged by Professor Rosenblum-are patent.
For example, the Preamble plainly rejects racism. 61 Yet, the
Convention itself is silent on race. Like Professor Rosenblum's
gendered critique, this silence renders the treaty vulnerable to a
race-essentialist critique; a challenge that it contemplates a
monolithic (white/Western/Northern) woman when the reality is
quite different. Women around the world are richly diverse in
terms of (among other things) race, sexuality, class, ethnicity,
religion, culture, and gender.
However, these shortcomings are not unique to CEDAW.
Rather, the critiques can similarly be deployed with respect to
I Id. at art. 2 (requiring, inter alia, inclusion of principle in "national
constitutions or other appropriate legislation"; and taking "appropriate measures
to eliminate discrimination against women bya any person, organization, or
enterprise"; and taking measures "to modify). See also id. at art. 3 (asking state
parties to ensure women's full exercise of human rights by taking "appropriate
measures" in "all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and
cultural fields..."); art 5 (requiring measures to change cultural patterns on
stereotyped sex roles, including recognition of "maternity as a social function"
and that both men and women have roles to play in raising children).
61 See id. at pmbl. (explicitly stating that: "Emphasizing that the
eradication of apartheid, all forms of racism, racial discrimination, colonialism,
neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and domination and interference
in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of
men and women.").
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other treaties that focus on particular populations. For instance,
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) broadly focuses on race with the same
aims regarding race as CEDAW has regarding sex. Also, like
CEDAW, CERD is underinclusive; it is silent on sex and gender.
Yet we know from CEDAW's preamble of the interrelationship
of sex and race in creating inequality.
Thus, the solution, I posit, is not to throw out CEDAW and
any or all other imperfect agreements. There exists a human
rights regime, the aim of which is to achieve justice. 62 In
pursuing that goal, it has focused on those who historically have
been vulnerable. But history and learning is not static. Every day
creates history. In much earlier times it would have been
unthinkable that women and racial minorities, for example,
would be entitled to equality. There existed categories that dared
not speak their names. In contemporary times thinking has
evolved-aided by sociology, anthropology, psychology, law,
science, medicine, technology-and different vulnerable and
excluded categories are ripe for recognition and naming. Thus,
rather than trash existing protections, we should both craft new
ones and utilize interpretive tools to develop, expand, and
transform the meaning and content of the protections that exist.
This way, the Convention can be a living document that can be
of use in modem times.
A. Interpretive Moves
In this Subpart I want briefly to suggest three ways in
which the Convention can be interpreted to achieve the
62
Although I embrace the indivisibility, interdependence and
interrelatedness paradigm of the international human rights system, it is not
uncritically that I do so. In separate works I have soundly criticized the system
for its multiple biases including its North/West, heteronormative, sexed,
gendered, racialized, and class biases. I have suggested reformations to remedy
the biases and it is with that reformed model in mind that I offer my analysis
here as a means to SuperSex CEDAW. See generally Berta E. Hcrnndez-Truyol,

Human Rights, Globalization, and Culture - Centering Personhood in the
International Narrative, in MORAL IMPERIALISM-A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY

(Berta E. Hemdndez-Truyol ed., 2002); Berta E. Hemfindez-Truyol, Sex and
Globalization, II HARV. LATINO L.R. 173, 182 (2008). On the critique of the
human rights system, see also DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE
(2004).
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protections that Professor Rosenblum desires. First is the basic
point that the discrimination prohibited by the Convention is on
the basis of sex. To be sure, it focuses on women. However, the
Preamble invokes the UDHR, noting its prohibition against sex
discrimination. 63 It also mentions that the Covenants mandate
equality and non-discrimination. 64 Furthermore, Article 1 of
CEDAW defines discrimination against women as
discrimination on the basis of sex. 65 Thus, notwithstanding the
title of the Convention, it is plain that it prohibits sex
discrimination. Consequently, particularly in light of
contemporary thinking about and usage of the terms sex and
gender, it can be argued that men should also be able to invoke
the Convention's prohibitions against discrimination. To be sure,
there is precedent in local law to support6 6such an interpretation
notwithstanding the norm's original goal.
Second, it is significant, particularly in the context of the
time when the Convention was adopted, that it pays much
attention to what we, in today's language, would call gendered
(as opposed to sex-based) concerns. 67 The Convention
specifically prohibits the use of gendered roles in raising
families, in educational paths, in employment choices, in
63CEDAW, supra note 4, at pmbl. ("Noting that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights affirms the principle of the inadmissibility of discrimination
and proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights
and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein,
without disfunction of any kind including distinction based on sex.").
64Id. ("Noting that State Parties to the International Covenants on Human
rights have the obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women to enjoy
all economic, social, culturp], civil atid political rights.").
65Id. at art. I ("[Tihe term 'discrimination against women' shall mean any
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex .... ").
66Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding
males can be target of discrimination by members of same sex).
67See, e.g. CEDAW supra note 4, at pmbl. (referring to traditional roles of
men and women); id. at art. 2 (requiring measures to "modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices" that are discriminatory); id. at art. 3
(stating to parties to take measures in, inter alia, cultural fields so as to guarantee
human rights and fundamental freedoms); id. at art. 5 (mandating abolition of
stereotyped roles); id. at arts. 10, I1 (requiring elimination of stereotyped notions
of appropriate education and work, respectively).
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pretextual deployment of cultural tropes, and in customary (as
well as conventional) laws. Thus, given the "living law" model,
the Convention's prohibitions against sex-based stereotypes can
be viewed as constituting the use of dated language which today
can be interpreted as meaning sex or gender.
Third, beyond the Convention itself, we can look at
international and regional legal decisions that support an
interpretation of its provisions in a way that develops, expands,
and transforms them. For example, the Article I nondiscrimination provision in the Convention prohibits
discrimination and mandates equality in "any ... field. '68 This
open-ended language uses "field," rather than "status," because
it is a "status" treaty. 69 However, the documents that are "field"
based-the UDHR (including civil, political, social, economic,
and cultural rights) and the two Covenants, the ICCPR and the
ICESCR-prohibit discrimination on the familiar litany of
status-based classifications as well as on "other status."70
The open-endedness of the "other status" and "any field"
language is useful in proposing this broad interpretive model. In
Toonen v. Australia,7I a member of the Tasmanian Gay Law
Reform Group claimed discrimination and challenged
Tasmania's criminalization of sodomy. The Human Rights
Committee found that Australia violated the Covenant because,
for purposes of Article 17's privacy protections, "adult
consensual sexual activity in private is covered by the concept of

68CEDAW, supra note 4, at art. I.

69 Human rights treaties can be classified into those that address a
particular field such as civil or political rights or social, economic and cultural
rights and those the concern of which is a person's status such as being children,
women, or racial minorities.
70 See UDHR, supra note 9, at art. 2; ICCPR supra note 9, at art. 2;
ICESCR supra note 9, at art. 2.

71Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, Decision on
Admissibility, (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 5, 1992).
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'privacy.' ' 72 Moreover, the HRC noted that it did not have to
reach the question of whether sexual orientation was covered by
"other status" because "in its view[,] the reference to 'sex' in
[of the ICCPR] is to be taken as
articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26
73
including sexual orientation.
This decision supports a broad and inclusive reading of the
term "sex" in international human rights documents generally
and in CEDAW specifically, expanding its reach. Indeed, it
supports not only the explicit application of the treaty to sexual
orientation, but it also implies the inclusion of gender. This
interpretive move is facilitated by the Convention's express
concern with sex role stereotyping and its "other fields"
language that show an intent for the document not to be frozen
in words or, I suggest, in time.
In sum, the Convention's reference to gender stereotypes
and to culture, taken together with the prohibitions in the
Convention as well as in other documents against sex
discrimination, can be utilized to expand and modernize the
reach and application of CEDAW in light of the existing
interpretations expanding the meaning of terms such as "sex." I
posit that, given its importance in light of the reality of women's
lives (see Part II) and the potential for expansive interpretive
moves, we need not contemplate unsexing CEDAW. In addition
to the suggested interpretative moves this work urges that we
super-sex CEDAW. That is, by protocol, transform and
effectively update it by expanding it to cover men, as well as
gender, gender identity, and sexuality categories.
However, because I agree that such moves are not enough
literally or symbolically and thus not a complete solution to the
72Id. at 8.2. At issue were two provisions of Tasmania's Criminal Code
which criminalized sodomy between consenting adult males. The European
Court of Human Rights has also stated that Ireland's laws prohibiting consensual
adult homosexual conduct violate the privacy protections of Article 8 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. See Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 EHRR 186 (Eur. Ct.
H.R.1988). The South African Constitution of 1996 protects the rights to privacy
and to dignity and, the equal protection clause expressly lists gender, and sexual
orientation as prohibited grounds for discrimination.
73

1d. at 8.7.
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challenges Professor Rosenblum presents, I suggest that we
further super-sex CEDAW. This would involve developing,
expanding and transforming the content and meaning of the
Convention by Protocol so as to include prohibitions against
discrimination not only against women but also explicitly on the
grounds of sex, sexuality, gender and gender identity. Moreover,
just as the category women should be understood as nonessentialized and non-monolithic, so, too, the expanded
categories of coverage should be understood and underscored to
be non-essentialized and non-monolithic. Indeed, the Protocol
should make clear the understanding of the multidimensional
nature of every human being. The next Part engages that
proposal.
IV.

Super-Sexing CEDAW

The suggestions presented in Part III can provide some
comfort in terms of the reach of the Women's Convention.
Nonetheless, we still have to face its exclusionary and
incomplete nature.
Start with the name. I cannot envision the name totally
changing-for both symbolic and historical reasons. But in
today's world there are concerns beyond sex that are intimately
related to sex, such as gender, sexuality and gender identity, that
the Convention can and should address explicitly. For that
reason I propose a methodological move: amend the Convention
to be more inclusive and reflect modem realities. As such,
beyond Professor Rosenblum's suggestions that gender or sex
replace "woman," I suggest that not only should gender and sex
join "woman" as identitarian categories covered by the treaty,
but that the treaty should also cover sexual and gender identity.
One way of achieving this is by a second optional protocol to
CEDAW which, much like the protocol of San Salvador
amended the American Convention on Human Rights to expand
the meaning and content of social, cultural and economic
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rights, 74 will amend CEDAW by expanding its meaning and
content to include gender, gender identity, sex, and sexual
identity-all categories that should not be considered to be
binary, dichotomous, monolithic, or essentialized.
This is by no means a fully safe model. For years now,
feminist, queer, and critical race theories have engaged in
deconstructive analyses of identitarian categories including race,
sex, gender, and sexuality and their multidimensional
presentations and performances. Any social category that can be
named, can be-and likely will be--contested. 75 However, I
urge that it is better to err on the side of inclusion with respect to
protections. In addition, it is imperative to ensure that there is
constant monitoring on the development of knowledge so that
law and reality can work together to make a more just world for
all.
With these caveats in mind, I propose the incorporation of
principles akin to the Yogyakarta Principles, as a second optional
protocol to CEDAW.76 The Yogyakarta Principles, to be sure, are
subject to the general critiques to which human rights as a
discipline has been subject, to wit, that they focus on statist
efforts over other organizing strategies that might better effect
74See Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 9. The American Convention,
supra note 9, as initially adopted, included a chapter entitled "Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights" that was comprised of only one article, Article 26 named
Progressive Development which required "State Parties . . . to adopt
measures.., with a view to achieving progressively... the full realization of the
rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural
standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States ......
The Protocol of San Salvador effects the development, expansion and
transformation of the American Convention by creating specific obligation
pertaining to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights including non-discrimination
(art. 3), right to work (art. 6), just, equitable and satisfactory conditions of work
(art. 7), trade union rights (art. 8), right to social security (art. 9), right to health
(art. 10), right to a healthy environment (art. I I), right to food (art. 12), right to
education (art. 13), right to benefits of culture (art. 14), right to the formation and
protection of families (art. 15), rights of children (art. 16), protection of the
elderly (art. 17), protection of the handicapped (art. 18).
75 See JUDITH LOBER, BREAKING THE BOWLS (2005) (promoting the idea
to "de-gender").
76 From the discussion in the latest draft of UNSEX CEDAW that I have
seen, Professor Rosenblum would appear to agree with such approach.
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equality and that its multiple structural biases fail to promote full
personhood for all. 77 The Principles are based on legal standards
that will bind states. And while they are "neutral" in terms of
hierarchies, among the marginalized the reality of life is quite
different, with structural racial, gendered, and sexed biases
permeating across cultures. 78 Regrettably, neutrality on paper
does not translate to equality in real life.
These Principles are useful to suggest the necessary
amendments to super-sex CEDAW and include sexuality,
gender, and gender identity to its coverage so that it reach its
potential for promoting human dignity and full personhood. The
'79
Principles "affirm that human rights admit no exceptions.
Much like the background history that led to CEDAW, the
Yogyakarta Principles were developed in response to reality:
[H]uman rights violations targeted toward
persons because of their actual or perceived
sexual orientation and gender identity
constitute a global and entrenched pattern of
serious concern. They include extrajudicial
killings, torture and ill treatment, sexual
assault and rape, invasions of privacy,
arbitrary detention, denial of employment and
education opportunities, and serious
discrimination in relation to the enjoyment of
other human rights. 80
77See, e.g., Kennedy supra note 62; Hemindez-Truyol, supra note 62.
7' See Berta Esperanza Hermnndez-Truyol, The Gender Bend: Culture,
Sex, and Sexuality-A LatCritical Human Rights Map of Latina/o Border
Crossings, 83 IND. L.J. 1283 (2008); Berta E. Hermnndez-Truyol, Out of the
Shadows: Traversing the Imaginary of Sameness, Difference, and Relationalism
-A Human Rights Proposal, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. III (2002); Berta E.
Hernhndez-Truyol, Crossing Borderlands of Inequality with International Legal
Methodologies-The Promise of Multiple Feminisms, 44 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 113
(2001).
79 Conference of International Legal Scholars, Yogyakarta, Indonesia,
Nov. 6-9, 2006, Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human
Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Mar. 2007),
available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles en.pdf.
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These realities dovetail with women's realities around the world,
including the compounding of the problem with the added
dimensions of "race, age, religion, ability, economic, social or
other status."81 The substantive protections urged by the
Principles also dovetail with CEDAW's protections: equality and
non-discrimination, personhood, life, security, privacy,
trafficking, work, education, housing, health, family, and culture.
With these compatible aims, the methodological proposal for
super-sexing CEDAW-adopting a protocol that develops,
expands, and transforms CEDAW into a broader document that
promotes justice and full personhood for all-should be
unproblematic, indeed uncontroversial.
CONCLUSION
This short Article urges that, instead of unsexing CEDAW,
it should be super-sexed by expanding the convention to include
sexuality, gender, and gender identity. The proposal, which
agrees with the substance of Prof. Rosenblum's argument in
principle but not in methodology, is grounded upon the reality
that "woman" as a sex category is still needed. Yet, it would be
irresponsible and unprincipled to ignore that sex, race, gender,
sexuality, and gender identity are all axes upon which
marginalization and exclusion of, as well as violence against,
"others" takes place.
In all cases, and with respect to all categories, it is
imperative not to essentialize. We need to be cognizant that it is
the dominant ideologies and discourses that create the
subjectivities with which Professor Rosenblum's piece, as well
as this response, grapple. Identity is performed within social and
cultural frameworks; the legal frameworks need to be sensitive
to this reality. Whether the classification "woman" is legitimate,
and in spite of the fact that there is no such thing as a unitary
woman, people who are perceived to constitute that category
(and that can be different persons in different cultural settings,
and in varied geographical and social contexts) are less likely to
enjoy full personhood and its trappings. These exclusions are
exacerbated when multiple outsider categories converge in one
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performance. The same conclusions flow if one substitutes
gender or sexual minority/outsider, or gender identity.
This is the flaw Professor Rosenblum uncovers in
CEDAW: The coexisting reality that vulnerable men-be they
poor; not male-gendered; sexual, religious, or racial minoritiessuffer deep privations of civil, political, social, economic, and
cultural rights. CEDAW's focus on women obscures and
impedes these conversations. However, CEDAW, as it stands,
serves to underscore that worldwide human beings experience
privation at a disproportionate rate because they are women.
Rather than abandon a legitimate and useful category, we ought
to center multidimensionality and include sex, gender, gender
identity, and sexuality in the international narrative on equality
in order to promote all human flourishing.

